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Reception, Gratitude and Obligation:  
Lessing and the Classical Tradition 
 
John T. Hamilton  
 
 
 
I 
 
In the prefatory remarks to his Rettungen des Horaz (“Redemptions of Horace,” 1754), Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing elucidates his approach to classical antiquity by means of an elaborate analogy: 
 
I myself can think of no occupation more pleasant than scrutinizing the names of famous 
men, investigating their right to eternity, wiping away undeserved stains, eliminating the 
false patches that cover their weak spots—in brief, doing everything in a moral sense that 
he, who is entrusted with supervising a picture gallery, performs physically.1  
 
It should come as no surprise that, in composing an essay on Horace, the 23-year-old scholar 
would modify and deploy one of the poet’s most influential analogies: ut pictura poesis. On the 
basis of this time-honored maxim, salvaging a poet’s name comes to be likened to restoring an 
old painting; supervising a literary tradition is comparable to overseeing a picture gallery. What 
is less expected is Lessing’s particular usage: rather than revert to the Ars poetica dictum as a 
way of engaging in the sister-arts debate, rather than explicating the phrase’s import or assessing 
                                                
1 “Ich selbst kann mir keine angenehmere Beschäftigung machen, als die Namen berühmter Männer zu mustern, ihr 
Recht auf die Ewigkeit zu untersuchen, unverdiente Flecken ihnen abzuwischen, die falschen Verkleisterungen ihrer 
Schwächen aufzulösen, kurz alles das im moralischen Verstande zu tun, was derjenige, dem die Aufsicht über einen 
Bildersaal anvertrauet ist, physisch verrichtet.” Rettungen des Horaz (1754), in G.E. Lessing, Werke und Briefe, 12 
vols., W. Barner et al, ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1987 – 98), 3: 159.  Subsequent citations 
from Lessing’s works are from this edition, marked WB with volume and page numbers.   
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its truth value, he applies it to the needs of the present, appropriating and adopting it in order to 
characterize his own critical practice. Whereas others might invoke the Horatian ut pictura 
poesis to uphold the fundamental similarity of the arts, Lessing exploits it to distinguish his 
analytical tactics. With rhetorical but no less self-directed legerdemain he transmutes the pictura 
into curatorship and poesis into criticism. A prescription for a poet becomes a description for a 
reader. Without delving too far into the validity and implications of this recalibration, it is 
sufficient to note that Lessing perpetuates the tradition of ut pictura poesis by interrupting it, by 
redirecting its course so as to make it articulate his specific method in the present. Horace’s 
famous analogy is of continued relevance thanks to this individual gesture of discontinuity and 
détournement.2  
 Even for those only slightly familiar with Lessing’s work, this early appearance of the 
correlation between painting and poetry cannot fail to recall the later Laokoon essay (1766), 
where ut pictura poesis serves as the argument’s principal point of departure and object of 
critique. From our own privileged position of posterity, we could relate the caution expressed in 
the Laokoon back to the statement from the Rettungen made twelve years prior. The Laokoon 
preface stresses that the conventionally accepted affinity between verbal and visual art is indeed 
an analogy, which is to say, it can declare similarity only on the basis of essential differences. 
Once more, continuity presupposes discontinuity. What motivates Lessing’s Laokoon is nothing 
other than the alleged fact that the constitutive dissimilarities have not been regarded with 
sufficient consideration. To illustrate this claim, Lessing conjures three types of recipients: the 
“amateur” (Liebhaber), the “philosopher” (Philosoph) and the “critic” or “judge of art” 
(Kunstrichter). The amateur and the philosopher attend simply to what both sides of the 
                                                
2 On the tension between continuity and discontinuity in the Rettungen des Horaz, see my article, “Thunder from a 
Clear Sky: On Lessing’s Redemption of Horace,” Modern Language Quarterly 62 (2001), 203 – 218.  
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comparison share: painting and poetry both represent (i.e., they are both mimetic); they both 
create illusions; they both share a common source in nature. However, the astute Kunstrichter is 
further capable of judging what distinguishes one art-form from the other. In implicitly adopting 
this critical role, Lessing draws out a series of differences, not yet between the art-forms but 
rather between their three stereotypical recipients: the amateur discovers affinity by way of a 
“subtle feeling,” while the philosopher arrives at the same by ascribing “general rules to a 
number of things”; finally, the critic, who alone is positioned in this famework to notice the 
dissimilarities between painting and poetry, does so once more by applying his observations, by 
turning them toward—an-wenden—the specific matter at hand: “The principal value of [the 
critic’s] obsevations depends on their correct application [Anwendung] to the individual case.”3   
David Wellbery has concisely outlined the theoretical premises behind this tripartite 
analysis: “The standpoint of the critic, his field of activity, is language—not mute, immediate 
experience of the individual instance, nor conceptualization that subsumes all individuals 
beneath universals, but that difficult middle region where experience first becomes ordered, 
categorized, articulated.”4 In other words, the critic’s position illustrates yet another Horatian 
ideal, the “golden mean” drawn from Aristotelian ethics which here negotiates the extremes of 
particular feeling and abstract reason. Just as the Rettungen preface accomplished a literary 
détournement, turning Horace’s poetic pronouncement (ut pictura poesis) into a criterion for 
criticism, the Laokoon preface adapts an Aristotelian-Horatian ethical ideal (aurea mediocritas) 
to address aesthetic problems. Whereas Wellbery tacitly invokes the aurea mediocritas to outline 
                                                
3 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, E. A. McCormick, trans. 
(1962; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 3. [“bei den Bemerkungen des Kunstrichters beruhet 
das Meiste in der Richtigkeit der Anwendung auf den einzeln Fall”; Laokoon: oder über die Grenzen der Malerei 
und Poesie, WB 5/2: 13]. 
4 David Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 101.  
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its import for eighteenth-century semiotic and aesthetic theories, my consideration of Lessing’s 
critical approach maintains the emphasis on balance as belonging to a realm of inquiry that 
Wellbery does not address directly, namely the realm of ethics or morality. Beyond the 
doubtlessly crucial aspects of semiotics and aesthetics, there is also a moral-ethical dimension 
which, I would argue, instigates Lessing’s career-long engagement with and interpretation of the 
classical tradition.   
The issue of morality is explicitly broached in the Rettungen passage cited above: Like an 
expert conservateur assigned with the task of physically restoring a painting to its original state, 
the philologist morally rehabilitates an author’s legacy. As the Laokoon discussion has alerted 
us, the analogy reveals as much as it conceals, marking both a continuum and a fundamental 
discontinuity between its two terms. The morality of the literary word seems to be equated with 
the materiality of the image, but only by being distinguished from it. Lessing would expend 
much curatorial energy in rescuing the dignity of classical authors; and did so generally, as 
described in this remark, through methods of removal—by “wiping away stains,” by 
“eliminating false patches.” As the English cognate ridding suggests, his Rettung project strives 
to conserve and give new life to received texts by cleansing them of tradition and thereby freeing 
writers from the abuse that compromised their claims to eternity. Yet, it is important to note, 
Lessing is no servile adulator of the classics—the “false patches” to be removed cover “weak 
spots” (Schwächen) that are undeniably there. Accordingly, the poet’s moral reputation can only 
be saved by the moral interventions of the present-day reader.  
As our modern critical term reception implies, works of art and literature should be 
understood as gifts. To open a book or behold a sculpture is to receive something that has been 
given over, something that has been delivered or entrusted to us—in Latin, a traditum. In this 
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sense every reader is an heir, every viewer a grantee. Thus conceived, a tradition inscribes the 
reader, viewer or spectator into a system of exchange, which may or may not be respected. 
Having received, one arguably incurs a debt and is henceforth summoned to offer something in 
return. With remarkable consistency, throughout his engagement with the classical tradition, 
Lessing acts as a moral agent by acknowledging this debt, by demonstrating the kind of gratitude 
that does not fetishize or selfishly hoard the gifts received but rather obligingly provides fresh 
gifts to be passed along to others. Thus Lessing encourages critical engagement among his own 
contemporary readership within the public sphere.5 Gratitude breeds gratitude, which is shown 
by freely replying to rather than complying with the classical heritage entrusted to us, the things 
passed along, the tradita.  
 
 
II 
 
Lessing’s “occupation” (Beschäftigung) with Horace is also a “service”; he places himself in the 
position to “procure” (beschaffen) assured posterity for the poet. Lessing regards the task of 
redeeming Horace as a responsibility owed to one of those “great minds” so admired that he 
would not tolerate “the slightest slander.”6 The moral imperative that motivates the Rettungen is 
therefore especially pronounced, insofar as it directly addresses the question of Horace’s own 
behavior or disposition, whether it was virtuous or vicious. What Lessing has in mind are the 
                                                
5 See Dorothea von Mücke, “Authority, Authorship and Audience: Enlightenment Models for a Critical Public,” 
Representations 111 (2010), 60 – 87. 
6 “[Ich] sage, daß auch ich einige große Geister so verehre, daß mit meinem Willen nicht die allergeringste 
Verleumdung auf ihnen haften soll.” (WB 3: 159) 
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accusations, ciriculated in the biographical tradition, that the Roman poet was a brilliant artist but 
a man of doubtful principles:  
 
Yes, it is said [man spricht] that Horace sang the tenderest and most charming songs, but 
no one was more a slave to lust than he; he praised bravery to the point of rapture but was 
himself the most cowardly of fugitives; he had the most sublime concepts of the divine 
but was himself its sleepiest worshipper.7  
 
Indeed, the allegations of prurience, pusillanimity, and impiety which derive from various 
ancient and early modern sources long befouled the image of the poet. Yet, Lessing’s duty is not 
restricted to correcting this unjust tradition. Rather, it aims to save tradition itself; for the 
malicious rumors hounding the poet invariably imperil his reception. Although Horace’s poetic 
genius is undisputed, although his Ars poetica remains an indispensible source for classical 
criteria, representing him as a man infected with vice may well furnish pedants and prigs with 
arguments dissuading the youth from reading this poet of poets. The slanderous biographical 
tradition therefore threatens to block the classical tradition itself: on moral grounds, books could 
be censored, galleries shut down. To defuse this risk, Lessing cites his own moral grounds: he 
will “do everything in a moral sense” (alles im moralischen Verstande zu tun) to keep tradition in 
force and alive.   
The Rettungen will not strive to salvage Horace from obsolescence but rather from the 
distortions produced by modern misreadings, deficient interpretations or noxious gossip. The 
                                                
7 “Ja, spricht man, er sang die zärtlichsten und artigsten Lieder, niemand aber war wollüstiger als er; er lobte die 
Tapferkeit bis zum Entzücken, und war selbst der feigherzigste Flüchtling; er hatte die erhabensten Begriffe von der 
Gottheit, aber er selbst, war ihr schläfrigster Verehrer.” (WB 3: 160) 
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project is not simple, insofar as we are asked to question the authority of received tradition on the 
basis of Lessing’s own and novel authority.8 Is his role as supervisor a bid for control—to work 
as self-designated culture gatekeeper and surveillance agent—or is his critique a sincere attempt 
to save tradition from itself? Can his moral orientation prevent his authoritative interventions 
from becoming fixed, in turn, into unassailable dogma? In either case, Lessing’s response to 
charges against the Roman poet is organized around the significance of hearsay, around the value 
of the “man spricht.” As Lessing indicates, the indictment of Horace’s laciviousness reaches 
back to an ancient biographical account, annexed to the Bodleian manuscript of the poet’s 
carmina and long attributed to Suetonius: Ad res venereas intemperantior traditur. Nam 
speculato cubiculo scorta dicitur habuisse disposita, ut quocunque respexisset, ibi ei imago 
coitus referretur – “It is related [traditur] that [Horace] was rather immoderate in sexual matters. 
For it is said [dicitur] that he enjoyed his whore in a mirrored bedroom, so that wherever he 
might look, he would get an image of intercourse.”9 To dispute this description, Lessing simply 
emphasizes the unrealiability of historical transmission: “traditur, dicitur: Two nice words for 
which many an honest man can thank the loss of his good name.”10 The notions of tradition and 
concomitant gratitude are no sooner broached than seriously undercut by mordant irony.  
This irony, however, should not be construed as a complete dismissal. Instead, it should 
remind us that the idea of tradition and the free-handed repayment it demands may assume many 
distinct forms. The tradition that Horace can “thank” for his ruined reputation is nothing more 
than a repertoire of conventional opinion—what Hans Robert Jauss characterizes as a “grown 
                                                
8 On Lessing and the issue of arrogated authority, see Wilfried Barner, “Authorität und Anmaßung: Über Lessings 
polemische Strategien, vornehmlich im antiquarischen Streit,” in Streitkultur: Strategien des Überzeugens im Werk 
Lessings, W. Mauser and G. Sasse, ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993), 15 – 37.  
9 Cited in WB 3: 162. It is presumed that the Vita Horati is from the chapter De poetis in Suetonius’ De viris 
illustribus. For a comprehensive discussion of this text, see Eduard Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1957), 1 – 43.  
10 “traditur, dicitur. Zwei schöne Wörter, welchen schon mancher ehrlicher Mann den Verlust seines guten Namens 
zu danken hat!” (WB 3: 162)  
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tradition”—which renders recipients passive and easily persuaded. This kind of tradition is still 
an inheritance, but one that is perceived more as a burden, as a heavy weight imposed by an 
authoritative source which calls for mere acquiescence.11 Elsewhere, Jauss identifies this debt as 
a “monological monument” to be rejected insofar as it demands an inauthentic response or facile 
obedience.12 In contrast, the historical-cultural donations that constitute a “chosen tradition” may 
be recognized in a dialogical fashion. Within a chosen tradition acceptance entails a commitment 
to answer, that is, through engaged interpretation, individual judgment, or creative recasting. In 
this case, reception history is specifically a history of taking and giving, of concerned attention 
and meaningful reciprocation.  
These two basic—and admittedly quite schematic—options turn on two distinct but 
related senses of the term tradition itself. Well before signifying an instruction or a saying 
handed down from former times, a traditio denoted any possession delivered from one party to 
another. The earliest extant usage generally linked the verb tradere to monetary or commercial 
issues, for example in Plautus’ Trinummus: argentum didi / thensauri causa, ut salvom amico 
traderem (“I gave the silver / for the sake of a treasure, that I might deliver it safe to a friend,” 
(Trin.1.2.142f.); or in the Asinaria, when a desperate Argyrippus pleads with Libanus for twenty 
minae: mihi trade istuc (“Hand it over to me!” As. 3.3.99).  It is only much later, from the 
Imperial period on, that traditio assumed the sense of an authoritative, dogmatic pronouncement 
that demanded compliance. In this later usage what the recipient was expected to give back was, 
if not silent conformity, a dutiful service to discover, explicate and adhere to an original, 
universal, eternal truth.   
                                                
11 Hans Robert Jauss, “Racines und Goethes ‘Iphigenie’” in Rezeptionsästhetik: Theorie und Praxis, R. Warning, ed. 
(Munich: Fink, 1975), 353 – 400; see esp. 389. For further discussion, see Irmgard Wagner, “Hans Robert Jauss and 
Classicity,” Modern Language Notes 99 (1984), 1173 – 1184.  
12 Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory” in Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, T. Bahti, trans. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 21. [Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 144 – 207; 171].  
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These two distinct usages of tradition—the monological-authoritarian sense and the 
dialogical-economic one—were persistently operative in Lessing’s work. From one perspective, 
in good Lutheran fashion, he often conjures the “odious name of tradition” to unmask these 
established legacies as paralyzing encumbrances, as formidable mechanisms of silencing.13 
Elsewhere, however, for example in the Laokoon, the term tradition loses its apostolic, papist 
baggage and is employed instead more positively as a line of thinking that continues to alter 
through history.14 Here, Lessing takes seriously the idea of a cultural tradition understood as a 
living endowment, one that still demands respect but nonetheless encourages active repayment in 
the form of critical scrutiny, informed interpretation, and pragmatic application. In this regard, 
Jauss’ portrayal corresponds well with Lessing’s ideal: “A literary work is not an object that 
stands by itself and that offers the same view to every reader in every period. It is not a 
monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence.”15 Across Lessing’s dealings with 
classical antiquity, the earlier, Plautine meaning of tradere remains in force, replete with its 
monetary, though gratuitous, implications. Characteristically, in the central scene of Nathan der 
Weise, when the Sultan Saladin asks for financial support, he first receives a complementary 
parable.  
 
 
 
 
III 
 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Lessing’s Sogenannte Briefe an verschiedene Gottesgelehrten (1779), WB 10: 190 – 92.   
14 For some representative instances from the Laokoon essay, see WB 5/2: 50 and 66.    
15 Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” 21.  
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Lessing recognized early on the merits of applying his reading. Already as a student cloistered in 
St. Afra, on his own initiative, he supplemened the school’s conventional curriculum in Latin 
authors by turning to the characters studies of Theophrastus and the comedies of Plautus and 
Terence. Later in life, in the preface to his collected Rettungen (1754), he would reminisce on 
these days in Meißen: “Theophrastus, Plautus and Terence were my world, which I studied in 
full comfort within the narrow setting of a cloistered school – How I wish to have these years 
back; the only ones in which I lived happily.”16 The explicit contrast between a nearly monastic 
existence (klostermäßig) and the wide “world” beyond these confines underscores the sense of 
freedom that the young man always linked to the moral realm. The rigorous grammatical training 
of the school’s regular course of study, with its emphasis on philological method and set 
disputationes, had quickly revealed its limits. In a letter to his mother he confessed, “I learned to 
realize, books would teach me well but would never make me a man.”17 Yet, his dissatisfaction 
with the traditional lesson plan did not neglect the possibility of an alternative tradition, one 
available through other books, in which he could discover an escape from the dust of 
Gelehrsamkeit, an outlet opening onto applicability, toward recognizing the tendencies, 
motivations and desires of those who populated the present, including himself. The letter 
continues:  
 
For a while I laid the serious books off to the side, to look around at that which is far 
more pleasant and perhaps just as useful. The comedies first came into my hands. It may 
appear unbelievable, but they have done me a very great service. I learned from them to 
                                                
16 “Theophrast, Plautus und Terenz waren meine Welt, die ich in dem engen Bezirke einer klostermäßigen Schule, 
mit aller Bequemlichkeit studierte —Wie gerne wünschte ich mir diese Jahre zurück; die einzigen, in welchen ich 
glücklich gelebt habe.” WB 3:154. 
17 “Ich lernte einsehen, die Bücher würden mich wohl gelehrt, aber nimmermehr zu einen Menschen machen” Letter 
to Justina Salome Lessing (20 Jan. 1749), WB 11/1: 15.  
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distinguish good and constrained, rough and natural conduct. From them I got to know 
true and false virtues, and to flee vices because of their ridiculousness just as much as 
their shamefulness. […] But I might have almost forgotten the noblest use that these 
plays have afforded me. I got to know myself, and since that time I certainly haven’t 
laughed or sneered at anyone more than myself.18  
 
As Lessing elaborates in his Beyträge zur Historie und Aufnahme des Theaters, published in 
1750 upon abandoning his university studies, it is precisely this capacity for inciting self-
knowledge that defines ancient comedy’s service to the modern German stage.19  
The moral, educative role of comedy was, of course, a commonplace of eighteenth-
century theory. It had been emphasized, for example, by Shaftesbury who proposed that 
“ridicule,” as opposed to regulative reason, should serve to test the validity of any idea or place 
any moral decision on trial: “Truth, ’tis supposed, may bear all lights; and one of those principle 
lights, or natural mediums, by which things are to be viewed, in order to a thorough recognition, 
is ridicule itself, or that manner of proof by which we discern whatever is liable to just raillery in 
any subject.”20 The more purely rationalist tradition as well confirmed the capacity of comedy to 
work as a corrective. For example, Johann Christoph Gottsched, following French neo-classical 
theory, underscored the satirical display of vice as an implicit means of extolling virtue. In the 
                                                
18 “Ich legte die ernsthaften Bücher eine zeitlang auf die Seite, um mich in denjenigen umzusehn die weit 
angenehmer, und vielleicht eben so nützlich sind. Die Comoedien kamen mir zur erst in die Hand. Es mag 
unglaublich vorkommen, wem es will, mir haben sie sehr große Dienste getan. Ich lernte daraus eine artige und 
gezwungne, eine grobe und natürliche Aufführung unterscheiden. Ich lernte wahre und falsche Tugenden daraus 
kennen, und die Laster eben so sehr wegen ihres lächerlichen als wegen ihrer Schändlichkeit fliehen. […] Doch bald 
hätte ich den vornehmsten Nutzen, den die Lustspiele bei mir gehabt haben, vergessen. Ich lernte mich selbst 
kennen, und seit der Zeit habe ich gewiß über niemanden mehr gelacht und gespottet als über mich selbst.” WB 11/1: 
16. 
19 See esp. Lessing Vorrede to the Beyträge, WB 1: 726 – 33.  
20 Shaftesbury, Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour; cited in Edward Brewer, “Lessing and ‘The Corrective 
Virtue in Comedy,’” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 26 (1927), 1 – 23, 2.   
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Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst (1730), Gottsched regards the combination of the vicious 
and the ridiculous as the sole criterion for defining comedy: “One should therefore note well that 
neither the vicious nor the ridiculous belongs in comedy on its own; rather, both belong 
together.”21  
Lessing acknowledged the central role of exposing immoral behavior as laughable, yet he 
also saw the merit in positively representing virtue by an appeal to the spectator’s emotions, 
something that Gottsched rejected as compromising the classic identity of the comedic genre. He 
justified his defense of comédie larmoyante by championing the plays of Plautus which 
Gottsched tended to subordinate to the more classically correct work of Terence. In his critical 
biography of Plautus, published in the Beyträge zur Historie und Aufnahme des Theaters, 
Lessing cites the wording that, according to Aulus Gellius, adorned the playwright’s tombstone.  
 
Postquam est mortem aptus Plautus, Comoedia luget:  
Scena est deserta. Hinc ludus risusque jocusque  
Et numeri innumeri simul omnes collacrimarunt.22  
 
 After Plautus died, Comedy mourns: 
 The stage is deserted. Here play and laughter and joke 
 And innumerable rhythms at once all cry together. 
 
                                                
21 “Es ist also wohl zu merken, daß weder das Lasterhafte, noch das Lächerliche für sich allein, in die Komödie 
gehöret; sondern beydes zusammen.” Johann Christoph Gottsched, Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst (1730; 4th 
ed., Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1751), 643. For a useful summary of Gottsched’s assessment and its relation to the 
development of German comedy, see Volker Riedel, Lessing und die römische Literatur (Weimar: Böhlau, 1976), 
32 – 34.  
22 Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 1:24; cited in WB 3: 745.  
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Plautus’ combination of farce and pathos may offend classical taste, but its applicability to 
Lessing’s own cultural context, its moral efficacy, secures the comic poet’s value. Thus, Lessing 
names Plautus’ Captivi “the finest comedy ever staged”: 
 
I call the finest comedy not that which is most probable and adhering to the rules, not that 
which has the most ingenious thoughts, the most agreeable ideas, the most delightful 
jokes, the most artful entanglements, and the most natural denouements, but rather I call 
the finest comedy that which, in addition to possessing in large part the beauties 
mentioned, comes closest to achieving its purpose. But what is comedy’s purpose? To 
form and improve the morals of the audience.23 
 
 This emphasis on moral application reflects a major shift, first discernible in the 1740s, 
whereby academic philology complemented its traditional practice of textual criticism, 
grammatical clarification, and lexical commentary with a newfound interest in interpretation. 
While Lessing was still a student in Leipzig, philology began to shed its subservient role as the 
“handmaiden” of theology and jurisprudence, and instead grappled in its own way with problems 
of meaning.24 Recalling the Rettungen passage cited at the head of this essay, we could say that 
philology no longer focused exclusively on the physical restoration of a text but rather worked 
towards the moral production of sense. Rather than establish a stable image, Lessing the 
philologist strove to put the text to present use, which is not to say that aspirations toward verity 
were entirely abandoned. As Robert Leventhal comments, “Certainly Lessing was concerned 
                                                
23 “Ich nenne das schönste Lustspiel nicht dasjenige, welches am wahrscheinlichsten und regelmäßigsten ist, nicht 
das, welches die sinnreichsten Gedanken, die artigsten Einfälle, die angenehmsten Scherze, die künstlichsten 
Verwicklungen, und die natürlichsten Auflösungen hat: sondern das schönste Lustspiel nenne ich dasjenige, welches 
seiner Absicht am nächsten kömmt, zumal wenn es die angeführten Schönheiten größtenteils auch besitzt. Was ist 
aber die Absicht des Lustspiels? Die Sitten der Zuschauer zu bilden und zu bessern.” WB 1: 876 – 77.  
24 Cf. V. Riedel, Lessing und die römische Literatur, 24.  
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with the ‘correctness’ and the ‘truth’ of interpretation, but this derived in the first instance not 
from an abstract knowledge or simply from the explication itself, but from the actual pragmatic 
application of such an interpretation.”25  
In stressing the obligation to provide an active response pertinent to the present, the idea 
of reception now veered toward the spheres of ethics and morality. Lessing’s interventions in the 
classical tradition consistently demonstrate this commitment, which further accounts for the 
polemical thrust of his critical writings. His readiness to enter into direct conflict with his 
contemporaries, his desire to correct and refine interpretation, to free it from what he would call 
“allegorical” foreclosure—all indicate a profound awareness of a literary critic’s moral 
obligation.  
Thus, in addition to redemption of Horace, Lessing published a “pocket manual” 
(Vademecum) designed to assist unfortunate readers through the heap of errors that maimed 
Samuel Gotthold Lange’s fresh translation of Horace’s Odes. Lessing’s ruthless approach, 
gleefully undertaken against the insufferably arrogant Pastor Lange, would continue to flourish 
in the series of reviews of the latest literature (Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend, 1759 – 
1765), where Lessing found many opportunities to denounce, correct and, when justified, praise 
recent German translations of ancient and modern works. Here, the moral duty is organized 
temporally, manifesting itself as a service to past authors, present readership, and the future 
republic of letters. The task is not only to resuscitate classical writers for present-day exchange, 
but also to ensure their ability to communicate in the time to come. Lessing does not refrain from 
justifying his mission in frightfully hyperbolic terms: “For the harm that they [critics and 
                                                
25 Robert Leventhal, The Disciplines of Interpretation: Lessing, Herder, Schlegel and Hermeneutics in Germany 
1750 – 1800 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 74. On Lessing’s contribution to eighteenth-century hermeneutic theory, see 
Dieter Kimpel, “Lessings Hermeneutik: Voraussetzungsprobleme seiner Kritik im europäisch aufklärischen 
Kontext” in Nation und Gelehrtenrepublik: Lessing im europäischen Zusammenhang, W. Barner and A.M. Reh, ed. 
(Munich: Text + Kritik, 1984), 218 – 31.   
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translators] cause is indescribable. – If in a great, miraculous global catastrophe, all books, 
except those written in German, suddenly perished, what pitiful figures would the Virgils and 
Horaces, the Shaftesburys and Bolingbrokes make in posterity!”26 The apocalyptic rhetoric 
reveals that Lessing, as self-appointed chief of the translation police, is concerned as much with 
a burgeoning sense of German literary identity as he is with preserving cultural legacies from the 
past and abroad. That he selects Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke to illustrate his point only 
confirms the moral substance of his efforts.  
 
 
 
IV 
 
Upon publishing the Laokoon at Eastertime 1766, Lessing eagerly waited to see how his work 
would be received by the authorities. Above all, he expected to hear from Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann, whose views on ancient art initiated his penetrating critique.27 What he did not 
expect was a letter from Christian Adolf Klotz, professor of philosophy and oratory at Halle, 
editor-in-chief of two major literary journals, and aspiring Latin poet. Just weeks after the book’s 
appearance—an event that Goethe would one day describe as a “lightning-bolt”28—Klotz penned 
an excessively flattering and rather saccharine letter to the author to express his undying 
                                                
26 “[D]enn der Schade, den sie stiften, ist unbeschreiblich. — Wenn durch eine große, wunderbare Weltveränderung 
auf einmal alle Bücher, die deutsch geschriebenen ausgenommen, untergingen; welch eine erbärmliche Figur 
würden die Virgile und Horaze, die Schaftesburys und Bolingbroks bei der Nachwelt machen!” Briefe, die neueste 
Literatur betreffend, Letter 7 (WB 4: 467 – 68) 
27 See WB 5/2: 952 – 53. 
28 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit in Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher 
und Gespräche, K.D. Müller, ed. (Frankfurt a.M: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 14: 345. For further 
discussion, see my article, “Fulguratores. Inscribing Thunderbolts in Lessing and Hölderlin,” Poetica 33 (2001), 445 
– 64.  
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admiration. Apparently reeling from Lessing’s coup de foudre, Klotz reminded the writer of how 
they met “at the tenderest age” of three in Bischofswerda and how, through Lessing’s 
publications, he since became a loving, genuinely devoted friend. Regarding this oddly 
adolescent outpouring of affection, Lessing would later remark: “I received this letter as one that 
would not have been any more or less expected than a letter from the man on the moon.”29 
Justifiably, he treated Klotz’s advances with caution, which ultimately angered the Halle 
professor. When Klotz’s quibbling review of the Laokoon appeared in the pages of his own Acta 
litteraria, it was clear that the erstwhile moonstruck fan had turned into a spurned Fury.  
 With feigned politeness and an intolerably pedantic tone, Klotz used the review to point 
out inaccuracies and cite other ancient sources that would presumably undermine Lessing’s 
argument. To retaliate, Lessing began to publish a series of Briefe, antiquarischen Inhalts (1768 
– 69), in which he demonstrates that a mere piling up of counter-examples only proves that Klotz 
and other unreflecting antiquarians have entirely failed to grasp the book’s central argument. 
These hostilities prepared the way for Lessing’s book-length essay, Wie die Alten den Tod 
gebildet (“How the Ancients represented Death,” 1769), which was provoked by yet another 
complaint by Klotz. In his preface to a German translation of the Comte de Caylus’ Tableaux 
tirés de l’Iliade, de l’Odyssée d’Homère et de l’Énéide de Virgile—a work that figured 
prominently in the Laokoon—Klotz once again took issue with Lessing’s exposition. In a 
footnote to the 11th chapter of the Laokoon, Lessing dismissed Caylus’s insinuation that Homer 
regrettably presented the personification of Death as the twin brother of Sleep, without offering 
any further attributes.30 In addition to defending Homer’s choice, Lessing in passing asserts that 
                                                
29 “Diesen Brief erhielt ich, als mir ein Brief von dem Manne aus dem Monde gerade nicht mehr und nicht weniger 
erwartet gewesen wäre.”The comment is from Letter 25 of the Briefe, antiquarischen Inhalts (1768), where Lessing 
reprints Klotz’s letter in full (WB 5/2: 559 – 60).  
30 Caylus is referring to Iliad 16.681 – 82, cited in WB 5/2: 95.  
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the ancients, unlike modern artists, never depicted Death with the “repulsive” (widerlichen) 
image of a skeleton. As usual, Klotz attempted to debunk Lessing’s claim by amassing a number 
of antiquities that do in fact bear this dreaded image.  
Before Lessing addresses Klotz’s complaint directly, he first discusses the value of 
conflict for the Enlightenment project. He admits that controversies may be impolite and cause 
discomfort; nonetheless this squeamishness “seems to want to forget that the Enlightenment has 
sheer contradiction to thank for so many important points.”31 To ignore conflict is to be 
ungrateful—undankbar. “Controversy has fueled the spirit of examination, has kept prejudice 
and prestige [Ansehen] in constant agitation; in brief, has hindered cosmetic untruth from 
establishing itself in the place of truth.”32  
The Antiquarische Briefe had already expressed this preference for intellectual debate. A 
motto in Greek, printed without any authorial attribution, adorns the title page, alluding to the 
occasional nature of the contents: Ἀγώνισµα µᾶλλον ἐς τὸ παραχρῆµα ἀκούειν ἢ κτῆµα ἐς αἰεί 
(“A contention for hearing in the moment rather than a possession for all time”). Well beyond 
describing the nature of the letters, the epigraph’s form reveals something crucial about 
Lessing’s method. The phrase is anonymous because it does not derive as such from any extant 
Greek text; rather it is Lessing’s own manipulation or new détournement of a line from 
Thucydides, who concludes that his History may not be immediately popular, that it was 
composed to be “a possession for all time rather than a contention for hearing in the moment”— 
κτῆµά τε ἐς αἰεὶ µᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισµα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆµα ἀκούειν (Hist. 1.22). Lessing’s ironic 
inversion of the sentence is not only a clear example of application, which bends Thucydides’ 
                                                
31 “Es scheinet vergessen zu wollen, daß es die Aufklärung so mancher wichtigen Punkte dem bloßen Widerspruche 
zu danken hat” (WB 6: 717). 
32 “Der Streit hat den Geist der Prüfung genähret, hat Vorurteil und Ansehen in einer beständigen  Erschütterung 
erhalten; kurz, hat die geschminkte Unwahrheit verhindert, sich an der Stelle der Wahrheit festzusetzen” (WB 6: 
717).  
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terms in order to speak to present circumstances, but also a performative rejection of 
“possessing” antiquity. For Lessing, gratitude does not allow the endowment of the classical 
tradition to be parsimoniously stockpiled or ostentatiously displayed like dead trophies to the 
owner’s vanity. Rather, the gracious recipient keeps the ancient patrimony in open circulation, 
using it, modifying it, passing it on, so as to keep the tradition alive and relevant: “a contention 
for hearing in the moment.” 
 The difference between an eternal possession and a current, momentary contention may 
serve to distinguish Lessing’s approach to tradition from Klotz’s. In Wie die Alten den Tod 
gebildet, Lessing proposes a striking opposition:  
 
An antiquities-monger [Altertumskrämer] is one thing, an antiquities-scholar 
[Altertumskundige] another. The former has inherited the fragments, the latter the spirit of 
antiquity. The former scarcely thinks with his eyes, the latter also sees with his 
thoughts.33 
 
Lessing laments the ubiquity of Altertumskrämer who have reduced the study of antiquity to a 
wretched state, “when the most learned therein is he who most readily and exhaustively knows 
how to enumerate such meager trivialities.”34 Thinking with the eye alone—which is “scarcely” 
(kaum) thinking at all—defines the procedures of empty “punditry” (Gelehrsamkeit), which 
unpacks, shelves and inventories material objects like a miser greedily counting the pieces in his 
collection. In contrast, the one capable of “seeing with his thoughts” deals with the same objects 
                                                
33 “Ein anderes ist der Altertumskrämer, ein anderes der Altertumskundige. Jener hat die Scherben, dieser den Geist 
des Altertums geerbet. Jener denkt nur kaum mit seinen Augen, dieser sieht auch mit seinen Gedanken” (6: 757).  
34 “wenn der der Gelehrteste darin ist, der solche Armseligkeiten am fertigsten und vollständigsten auf den Fingern 
herzuzählen weiß!” (WB 6: 757) 
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much differently. Having “inherited the spirit of antiquity,” his images are animated by thinking 
which renders them transparent rather than opaque. As the Laokoon persistently argued, the 
opposition between physical vision and moral, discursive cognition spells the difference between 
an imagination bound and unbound: “In poetry a garment is not a garment; it conceals nothing; 
our imagination sees right through it.”35 Accordingly, der Altertumskundige moves about within 
the freedom of the moral sphere, where one thought-image can be looked through onto another; 
as opposed to the Altertumskrämer who stumbles over his crammed collection, looking at things 
that fail to communicate any meaning.  
Klotz believed he could discredit Lessing’s claim that the ancients did not represent 
Death with a skeleton simply by enumerating example upon example of antique depictions of 
fleshless human remains. Bound to the material opacity of his antitquities, Klotz’s imagination 
can not transcend to an evaluation. Lessing elucidates: “I have asserted that the ancient artists did 
not represent Death as a skeleton, and I assert it still. Yet to say that the ancient artists did not 
represent Death as a skeleton, does this then mean that they never represented a skeleton at 
all?”36 For Lessing, Klotz’s problem is that he relies too much on a straightforward iconological 
or allegorical cipher; he seems to believe that every image unequivocally refers to a universal, 
unchanging idea. Lessing instead pulls images away from a universal referent and reads them, 
cognizant of their context and their particular function within each specific instance. To use 
again the terms laid out in the preface to the Laokoon, Klotz stumbles from playing two distinct 
roles, the role of the “amateur,” who gapes at an item’s immediacy, and the role of the 
                                                
35 Laocoön, McCormick, trans., 38. [“Bei dem Dichter ist ein Gewand kein Gewand; es verdeckt nichts; unsere 
Einbildungskraft sieht überall hindurch.” WB 5/2: 58 – 59]. On this point, see Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, 168.   
36 “Ich habe behauptet, daß die alten Artisten den Tod nicht als ein Skelett vorgestellt: und ich behaupte es noch. 
Aber sagen, daß die alten Artisten den Tod nicht als ein Skelett vorgestellt: heißt denn dieses von ihnen sagen, daß 
sie überhaupt kein Skelett vorgestellet?” (WB 6: 721 – 22) 
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“philosopher,” who hastily aims to subsume the item beneath a fixed concept. Lessing, ever the 
astute critic, would prefer to negotiate both poles, by applying immediate observations to the 
individual case.   
 
Here is an engraved gem, and there a marble urn, and over there a metalic image; all are 
undoubtedly anique, and all represent a skeleton. Very well! Who doesn’t know this? 
Who can not know this, if he is not lacking fingers and eyes, as soon as he wants to know 
it? Shouldn’t one have in antiquarian works something more than allegorizations? These 
ancient works of art represent skeletons: yet do these skeletons, then, represent Death? 
Must a skeleton absolutely represent Death, the personified abstraction of Death, the 
deity of Death? Why shouldn’t a skeleton simply be able to represent a skeleton? Why 
not even something else?37  
 
Before he submits a single piece of historical evidence, Lessing has already defeated Klotz with 
this logical argument.38 The crucial point here is that Lessing removes—or rids—the borders that 
constrain purely ocular thinking. His Rettung redeems tradition itself, a tradition that he shows to 
be not a heap of dead objects but living thought that is merely asleep and capable of being roused 
and heard again. Altertumskrämer like Klotz ungratefully kill off the tradition by locking it 
within the confines of pedantry, while an Altertumskundiger like Lessing acknowledges his 
                                                
37“Hier ist ein geschnittener Stein, und da eine marmorne Urne, und dort ein metallenes Bildchen; alle sind 
ungezweifelt antik, und alle stellen ein Skelett vor. Wohl! Wer weiß das nicht? Wer kann das nicht wissen, dem 
gesunde Finger und Augen nicht abgehen, sobald er es wissen will? Sollte man in den antiquarischen Werken nicht 
etwas mehr, als gebildert haben? Diese antike Kunstwerke stellen Skelette vor: aber stellen denn diese Skelette den 
Tod vor? Muß denn ein Skelett schlechterdings den Tod, das personifierte Abstraktum des Todes, die Gottheit des 
Todes, vorstellen? Warum sollte ein Skelett nicht auch bloß ein Skelett vorstellen können? Warum nicht auch etwas 
anders?” (WB 6: 722) 
38 Cf. Michael Morton, “Lessing’s and Herder’s Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet: A Critical Analysis of the 
Arguments,” Lessing Yearbook 35 (2003), 137 – 68; 139. 
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indebtedness and obligingly liberates tradition, allowing it to breathe and speak with renewed 
power within the public sphere.   
As Lessing points out, the central claim of Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet rests on the 
attested Greek practice of euphemism: the ancients’ “fondness for substituting less conspicuous 
words for those words which immediately arouse a disgusting, sad, ghastly idea.”39 Accordingly, 
Greek euphemism, which depicts Death as Sleep’s brother rather than as a skeleton or decayed 
corpse, reiterates Lessing’s own project of reception, already announced in the Rettungen des 
Horaz, which emphatically moves from immediate, physical concerns to mediated, moral ones. 
In turning away from Baroque-Christian portrayals of corporeal nature, Lessing further avoids 
identifying himself with his own mortal body, an identification, whose implacable limits would 
severely jeopardize any sense of a perfectly free, unbounded subjectivity.40 Yet, as Lessing must 
acknowledge, a disembodied subject is no subject at all: a free-floating, unencumbered cogito is 
but a philosopher’s fantasy, a fantasy that Lessing, as a critic, must renounce. Death, then, 
certainly remains a problem, but it may also install hope; for death is the prerequisite for 
revivification, just as sleep is for arousal, just as contradiction has proved to be for 
enlightenment.  
Among the fragments belonging to an earlier project on the life of Sophocles (ca. 1760), 
Lessing considers the scant testimony from antiquity and laments: “It will cost some effort to 
clothe this skeleton with flesh and nerves. It will be almost impossible to turn it into a beautiful 
                                                
39“Zärtlichkeit, diejenigen Worte, welche unmittelbar eine ekle, traurige, gräßliche Idee erwecken, mit minder 
auffallenden zu verwechseln” (WB 6: 764). 
40 See Dorothea von Mücke, “The Powers of Horror and the Magic of Euphemism in Lessing’s ‘Laokoon’ and ‘How 
the Ancients Represented Death,” in Body and Text in the Eighteenth Century, V. Kelly and D. von Mücke, ed. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 163 – 180; esp. 176 – 77. For a similar analysis on the role of 
euphemism in Lessing’s essay, see also Simon Richter, Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of Pain: Winckelmann, 
Lessing, Herder, Moritz, Goethe (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1992), 62 – 85.  
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form.”41 Notwithstanding, as always, his hand is poised to do the work, to invest the time, and 
properly honor the debt—“Die Hand ist angelegt.” If there is but little to observe with one’s 
eyes, there is much to see with one’s thoughts. And Lessing’s thoughts—Gedanken—are perhaps 
the most fitting expression of his boundless gratitude, his inexhaustible Dankbarkeit for what has 
been received.  
 
 
 
                                                
41 “Es wird Mühe kosten, dieses Gerippe mit Fleisch und Nerven zu bekleiden. Es wird fast unmöglich sein, es zu 
einer schönen Gestalt zu machen.” (WB 5/1: 238) 
